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ABSTRACT
Civil engineers are everyday faced with multidisciplinary problems. Their tasks are not only related to technical aspects, but also
involve ethical and environmental issues, economic considerations and, nowadays, international collaborations. This broad spectrum
of aspects requires a strong technical knowledge, as well as many interpersonal skills and an interest in societal related issues. When
traditional courses are simply adapted to the development of technical competences, introducing students to non-technical (although
civil engineering-related) aspects remains a challenge. To remediate to this difficulty, an innovative approach was implemented in the
undergraduate course of Soil Mechanics at Polytechnique Montreal. The originality of our approach relies on the study of failure case
studies from a forensic point of view and on the challenge of students with real world multidisciplinary applications. Students are thus
entirely involved in the case study and act as investigators recruited to find the cause of a failure and its impact on social and
environmental issues. This methodology prevents student passivity and the role of the professor is only to guide students towards a
holistic understanding of the events, rather than suggesting solutions for them. The paper will present the overall course design and
outline, from the selection of the failure case study to its implementation into the curriculum.

INTRODUCTION
Civil engineering is not limited to the construction or the
design of buildings, but is a multidisciplinary domain
involving technical aspects, project management and human
considerations. As a consequence, civil engineer students have
not only to receive a strong technical formation, but also to be
sensitized to non-technical aspects of engineering.
To address all multidisciplinary aspects, Polytechnique
Montreal uses a curriculum composed of a strong technical
base ranging from geotechnical to structural engineering and
some parallel courses, such as ethics or economy.
Nevertheless, a link has to be done between non-engineering
and engineering topics to introduce students to project
management, which represents a challenge composed of a
variety of problems. To this end, team projects have been
introduced in curriculums at Polytechnique Montreal to place
the students in a situation of management, where they have to
refer to different domains to find technical and economical
solutions to a pre-defined problem. This situation could be
seen as a top-down relation, from the management to the

Paper No. 1.09b

technic or from the need to the solution. On the reverse angle,
we tried to input a new approach in the course of soil
mechanics by putting the students in a technical situation and
asking them to go backward to the constraints of management,
economy or human relations.
This new approach relies on the use of case studies as a
support of motivation and concrete student training. Indeed,
Raju and Sanker (1999) demonstrated the importance of using
case studies in engineering education to expose students to
real-world issues and case studies have also been linked to the
increase of student motivation and interest in a subject
(Mustoe and Croft, 1999).
The use of case studies is opposed to traditional classrooms
where artificial problems are created to apply a new notion
such as a structural or a geotechnical theory. As the use of
artificial problems reinforces the viewpoint that projects are a
collection of individual problems such as schedules, structural
concepts, or environmental hazards (Chinowsky and al.,
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1997), we decided to base our approach on a case study
presented within lectures all along the semester. The use of a
recurrent case study during the semester illustrates the
complexity of engineering problems. It is opposed to singlefocus case studies that fail to highlight the numerous
interdisciplinary forces and can therefore give an inadequate
understanding of the civil engineering profession to the
students (Chinowsky and al., 1997).
The originality of this article relies on the preparation of the
case study to match the course of soil mechanics during the
whole semester. Some aspects of the case study are presenting
to illustrate a typical intervention in a lecture and the way to
link technical considerations to non-technical constraints.

COURSE OF SOIL MECHANICS
The curriculum of civil engineer students is composed of
4 years and the course of soil mechanics appears in the third
one, just before specialty orientations such as building and
civil engineering structures, environment, transportation,
geotechnical engineering and applied hydraulics.

Course structure
The course is composed of twelve three hour long lectures,
7 laboratories and 12 recitation classes. The Table 1 presents
the themes studied along the semester.
Table 1: Planning of the soil mechanics lectures
1
2

3

4
5
6

Description and classification of soils (I): physical
indexes, phase relations, grain size curve.
Description and classification of soils (II):
Atterberg’s limits, classification.
Description and classification of soils (III): clayey
minerals, structure of soils
Compaction: theory, material and method,
specifications and control.
Stresses in soils: total and effective stresses, vertical
and horizontal stresses.
Water in soils (I): capillarity, shrinking, swelling,
frozen soils.
Water in soils (II): permeability, hydraulic head,
Darcy’s law, one-dimensional flow, quicksand.

7

Water in soils (III): flow nets, filters.

Course in the curriculum

8

Consolidation and settlement.

This course is mandatory for students in the civil engineer
curriculum and is preceded by the material’s resistance course,
which is a prerequisite. Indeed, students need to have some
good notions of stress, deformation, stress-deformation
relation, tensile, compressive and shear strength, principal
stresses, and Mohr’s circles to succeed in this course.

9

Rate of consolidation.

Without being a formal prerequisite, the course of general
geology represents an asset for the comprehension of the
formation of soils and the mineralogy of clays.
Although it comes quite lately in the curriculum, the course of
soil mechanics constitutes an introduction to geotechnical
engineering and the attraction of students to this field of
engineering represents a challenge. Indeed, most of them have
been interested by the first courses in the curriculum and have
already chosen their orientation. As a consequence, many
students chose deliberately another specialty, even though
they find the initiation to geotechnical engineering very useful.
Even if the position of this course is not appropriate to catch
an early on attention of students, it would be difficult to
modify the curriculum. Indeed, students have to know how to
design a building and how to calculate the load lowering in
order to design a foundation able to respond to these
constraints.
The second challenge of this course is to attract students for
graduate studies in geotechnical engineering.
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11

12

Mohr’s circles and theory of rupture :
- Transformation of constraints,
- Mohr-Coulomb criteria,
- Direct shear test,
- Triaxial test principle (CD, CU, UU).
Shear strength of non-cohesive
and cohesive soils:
- Behavior of sands in CD and CU triaxial tests,
- total and effective stresses analyses,
- behavior of clays in CD, CU and UU triaxial tests.
Synthesis: key elements

Learning objectives
This course represents an initiation to geotechnical
engineering. As such, it does not intend to form students able
to design a retaining wall, an earth dam or a deep foundation,
but aims to give them a strong knowledge related to
mechanical and hydraulic behaviors of soils. This common
minimum represents a prerequisite for their future courses,
such as foundations, excavations, dikes and earth dams, and
road infrastructures. At the end of this course, the students are
able to:
 classify the soils based on their composition and their
behavior,
 analyse the phase relations of a soil element,
 select laboratory tests to respond to a given geotechnical
problem,

2

 analyse the results of basics laboratory tests
 describe the theory of compaction of soils
 describe the effects of water on the behavior of different
soils,
 evaluate the groundwater flows by analytical methods,
 draw a flow net under a dam or a foundation,
 calculate the total and effective stresses in a soil,
 analyse the compression of a soil layer,
 calculate the degree of consolidation of a clay,
 solve basics geotechnical problems, such as one
dimensional settlement.

Case study preparation
Preparation of the case study and lectures had to be done
simultaneously to insure a complementary cohesion between
the concepts learned in class and a portion of the case study.
During the summer of 2012, this course received funds from
the Center for teaching and learning to improve its course
notes. This fund was dedicated to the recruitment of two
students who had passed brilliantly the course and who
worked to prepare the notes for the case study. The
implication of previous students, able to take a step back in
relation to the course was very important.

CASE STUDY PRINCIPLE
To reinforce the attraction of this course, a new planning
relying on a case study has been introduced since
August 2012. The idea of this new approach is to present a
real problem of engineering to initiate the students to nontechnical constraints. This approach intends to sensitive the
students to the job that they will exercise all along their career
and, at a smaller term, to catch their attention for the rest of
the curriculum. Ethical considerations such as safety and
security also constitute an important aspect introduced in the
course.
As previously mentioned, the case study is used throughout
the semester and we refer to it each week. This case study is
used as a support for the discovery of new concepts by the
students and aims to apply the theory immediately. References
to the case are done at the end of lectures, during a 10 to 15
min presentation. Among the 12 lectures, 10 contain
references to the case study as presented in Table 1. A
reference to the case study represents the illustration of each
main chapter in the planning.
Studying a case presents some benefits as an interactive
learning strategy, shifting the emphasis from teacher-centered
to more student-centered activities (Grant, 1997), and active
learning activities such as small group reflection before
sharing with the class are also used to reinforce this
interaction.
The scheme of each reference to the case study is as follows:
 Brief links to the lecture to highlight the main points
of the course,
 Presentation of an element related to the case study:
particular design, choice of materials, geology,
hydraulic…
 Problematic or question related to this element: why a
particular design has been retained? What is the
impact of the geology on the project? Could we have
chosen other materials for the construction of the
project?
 Reflection in small groups (3 to 4 people)
 Answers and synthesis with whole classroom.

Their summer internship was divided into three parts:
- Bibliographic study related to the case (reports from
experts, papers…),
- Research related to case studies in teaching,
- Preparation of a PowerPoint support for each
presentation of the case.

Case study selection
To select the case study, we had to deal with several
constraints. The case study has to be important enough to
cover all the matter learned in classes. On the contrary, the
notions presented in the case must stay at a basic level as the
course is just an introduction to geotechnical engineering.
Finally, the case study has to cover non-technical aspects, such
as economics, human relations…
To sensitize students to the responsibility of engineers, we
decided to choose a case of failure and our attention had been
pointed to the Teton Dam failure, in 1976. This choice is
justified by:
 the multitude of documentation related to this dam:
reports from experts after the failure, papers, pictures,
videos…
 the relative simplicity of the design for a young
geotechnical engineer: earth dam involving soil
compaction, no deep foundation, except a cut-off
wall…
 the implication of economy via the choices done
during the construction and the damages resulting
from the failure.

TETON DAM CASE STUDY
Teton dam is unfortunately known as the highest embankment
dam that had ever failed in the history of earth dams.

History
As illustrated on Fig. 1, Teton Dam was located in the southeast of Idaho, approximately 64 km northeast of Idaho Falls.

Paper No. 1.09b

3

This dam was designed for multipurpose, such as flood
control, power generation, recreation, fish and wildlife
mitigation measures, and irrigation of 110,000 acres in the
Fremont-Madison Irrigation District (Schuster and Embree,
1980). This earth fill dam had a maximum height of 122 m,
was 940 m long and was supporting a reservoir whose
capacity was 333 Mm3. It was constructed under the
supervision of the US Bureau of Reclamation and the
construction was attributed to the consortium MorrisonKnudsen-Kiewit. Fieldwork started in June 1972 and the first
filling up started in October 3rd, 1975. Unfortunately, the
dam failed during this first filling up on June 5, 1976 (Jansen,
1980).

Local hydrogeology
Teton Dam was located in the Teton River canyon, whose
geologic area is bounded by the Rocky Mountain and the
Snake River Plain. The major geologic activities in the area
are the uplift of the Teton and Snake River and the associated
volcanic activity from Island Park and Yellowstone area
(Randle and al., 2000). During the late Pliocene and early
Pleistocene age, a flow of rhyolite coming from Yellowstone
Caldera was deposited over a pre-existing irregular landscape
and formed the Huckleberry Ridge tuff , a 70 to 200-metersthick formation (Pierce and Morgan, 1992).
The Teton River has cut a volcanic plateau, known as the
Rexburg Bench, resulting in a steep-walled canyon. The
canyon walls were composed of welded ash-flow tuff of
rhyolite. The north wall was very steep or vertical, and the
south wall was less steep and composed of a poorly sorted
mixture of talus, colluvium, and loess coming from the plateau
(Randle and al., 2000). Some alluvium had been deposited in
the river channel to a depth of about 30 m (Sasiharan, 2003).
A cross-section of the canyon is provided in Fig. 2.

Fig. 1 : Location of the Teton Dam
Approximately 308 Mm3 of water and 3 Mm3 of materials
were spread in the river in about 6 hours (Lloyd and Watt,
1981). The downstream destruction zone was very important
and reached the upper end of American Falls Reservoir,
located 95 miles from the dam. The maximum flowrate was
estimated at 28 300 m3/sec and was the source of deaths,
inundation and destruction.
This failure resulted in the death of 14 people and created an
unparalleled event in the history of Reclamation. Even though
legal experts stated that the Federal Government was not liable
for the flood damage, the Administration pointed out that the
United States had a moral obligation, and a special mention
was adopted to pay for damages. Thus, a compensation
slightly less than 400 million US$ was paid to claimants and
contractors who repaired the flood-damaged infrastructures.
After the failure, two independent groups were constituted to
investigate the failure: the Independent Panel (IP) and the
Interior Review Group (IRG). The IP was composed of nine
internationally recognized engineers, while the IRG was
composed of representatives from five Federal agencies
concerned with dam construction. Three reports were
produced by these groups: IP, 1976; IRG, 1977 and IRG,
1980.
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Fig. 2 : Cross section of the Teton River
As for all construction projects, extensive site exploration was
performed prior to construction. Percolation tests and pumping
tests revealed that the joints in the rhyolite-tuff were able to
transmit up to 380 l/min. These results demonstrated that the
extensive joint system was extremely permeable and needed to
be sealed to reduce the leakage to acceptable quantities.
Nevertheless, some pilot tests demonstrated that it would have
needed huge quantities of grout and that it would be more
economical to remove the top 23 m of rock and incorporate a
deep key trench to prevent seepage (Sasiharan, 2003).
It is finally important to mention that the high lands are
covered with loess in the area of the Teton River. The
thickness of this aeolian silt deposit can reach 9 m, which
represents a great quantity of material leading engineers to use
it the core of the dam.
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Reservoir filling and failure
Reservoir filling began in November 1975 and the water level
started to rise rapidly during the spring of 1976. According to
the design of the reservoir, the filling rate was expected to be
less than 30 cm per day, but an abnormal spring run-off and
some delays for the completion of the works resulted in a
higher filling rate reaching 120 cm per day during May 1976.
By June 5th, 1976, the water level was only one meter below
the spillway crest and 9 m below the embankment crest.
Abnormal observations were done two days before the failure,
when some small springs were observed at the riverbed level
about 450 m downstream from the embankment. On June 4th,
some additional springs had developed about 120 m from the
downstream toe, but an immediate inspection of the upstream
and downstream slopes of the embankment showed no
unusual condition. After these first observations, the failure
took place as follow:
 at 7h00 a.m. on June 5th, some water was flowing
from the downstream face of the embankment, about
40 m below the crest of the dam (see Fig. 3). The
flow was about 56 l/s;
 at the same time, a flow of about 700 l/s emerged
from the talus, near the toe of the embankment;
 during the next three hours, the flow from the
downstream face increased progressively up to
425 l/s at about 10h30 a.m.;
 after this time, the seepage increased rapidly
accompanied by progressive upward erosion
(see Fig. 4) and the complete failure occurred at
11h55 a.m. (see Fig. 5).

Fig. 5 : Failure of the Teton Dam
Photography credit : Arthur G. Sylvestre

Investigations by the independent panel (IP 1976)
According to the Independent Panel, two mechanisms were
most likely to have led to the failure. The first hypothesis was
related to seepage under the grout cap in unsealed joints of the
rock. This phenomenon would have led to erosion along the
base of the trench resulting in a piping failure through the key
trench fill. Some investigation tests revealed the presence of
non-sealed joints beneath the grout cap, reinforcing this
hypothesis. Nevertheless, no leaks were observed prior the
failure as it should had occurred if the phenomenon had
contributed to the failure.
The second hypothesis was related to hydraulic fracturing or
differential settlement resulting in a piping failure. Fracturing
tests and finite element analysis concluded that the stress
distribution could have led to hydraulic fracturing in the core
due to high water pressure upstream. Nevertheless, their
experimentation to generate hydraulic fractures in the field did
not succeed.
The IP concluded that although they described two main
mechanisms for the initiation of failure, it was impossible to
provide a final answer to the specific cause of failure of Teton
dam.

Investigations of the interior review group (IRG 1977)
Fig. 3 : initiation of the failure

Fig. 4 : progressive upward erosion
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The first conclusions of IRG’s report stated that the Teton
Dam was constructed as specified and failed as a result of
inadequate protection of the impervious core from internal
erosion. The cracking of the core material was pointed out as
the most probable mode of failure, but interface erosion at the
contact between the core and the rock was mention as another
probable mode.
However, the IRG recommended additional investigations
which consisted in testing the grouting conditions, excavating
the left part of the dam and performing finite element analysis
to support the study with relevant parameters. Some of these
further investigations will be present later in this article, as a
part of the case study presented to the students.

5

USE OF THE TETON DAM CASE STUDY IN THE
COURSE
The detail of the case study presentations is provided in
Table 2. As explained earlier, each presentation has to be
linked to the lecture and the themes are imposed by the course
outline. Two case study presentations are detailed in the next
paragraph as an illustration of the teaching approach.
Table 2: Planning of the case study presentations
Theme of the lecture
Description and
classification of soils (I)

Description and
classification of soils (II).

Description and
classification of soils (III)
Compaction
Stresses in soils

Case study
 Presentation of the Teton
Dam:
localisation,
geology, failure…
 Classification of the dam’s
materials: core, faces,
 Problem of Loess chosen
for the core,
 Atterberg’s limits for the
core
 Optimum Proctor curves
used for the design of the
dam.
 Method of compaction of
the core.
 Influence of water on the
mechanical behavior of
Loess.

Water in soils (I)

 Stresses in the core.

Water in soils (II)

 Treatment of the dam’s
foundation (waterproofing)

Water in soils (III)

 Flow net in a section of the
dam. Drainage.

Consolidation and
settlement.
Rate of consolidation.

 Effect of first filling up on
the deformation of the
dam.

Mohr’s circles and theory
of rupture.

 Dam’s behavior in case of
quick drawdown.

Shear strength of noncohesive and cohesive
soils.

 Slope stability (dam and
canyon located upstream).

Synthesis: key elements

 Case synthesis

Classification of soils
The presentation of the different materials involved in the dam
is a very good application of the Unified Soil Classification
System. Indeed, the dam contains five different zones with
five types of soils, from clayey silts to rocks as illustrated on
the simplified cross section provided on Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6 : Schematic cross-section of Teton Dam
With respect to the multitude of post-failure investigations, a
huge data bank related to the characterization of the soils was
available. As a consequence, we could easily give some
classification indexes to the students and ask them to classify
the soils in each zone. This first application was a good
opportunity to sensitize the student to the function of each
zone, such as:
- fine material in the core to ensure its function of
impermeability,
- well graded material disposed immediately against
the core to ensure its function of filtration and to
prevent any erosion,
- coarse material at the extremity to prevent the action
of water and precipitation.
The focus of this presentation was pointed to the material that
played an important role during the failure: the core of the
dam. Given its grain size curve whose percentage passing
under mesh 200 was approximately 88%, the students easily
determined that it was a silt and clay. Given the results of the
Casagrande liquid limit test device (27%) and the plasticity
limit equal to 23%, the students deduced that the plasticity
index was about 4% and that the soil was classified as a CLML, that is to say some clays and silts with low plasticity.
This finding closed the first step of direct application of the
course and, given this result of classification, the first question
was: according to the course that has just been presented, can
you explain what would be the influence of water on the
mechanical behavior of this soil? After a long blank, some
questions or remarks came from the class:
- we just have two results related to Casagrande’s
device and plasticity manipulations. How can we
quantify the influence of water on this soil?
- no indications related to the behavior of the soil with
respect to water are given …
- don’t we need any additional information related to
mechanical tests?
These remarks pointed out that the students had listen to the
course, but did not assimilate the notions of plasticity and
liquidity limits. When reminding that the behavior of a soil is
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“solid” when the water constant is under the plasticity limit
and “semi-liquid” while it remains above the liquidity limit,
the students did the link between the mechanical behavior of a
soil and its water content. The expected response came
immediately after this reminding and a student explained to
the others that a change of only 4% in the water content can
change the behavior of the soil, from solid to liquid. Finally,
they realized that the 4% only represents 40L of water for
1000 kg of dry soil! This illustrate clearly that the definition of
plastic and liquid limit did not means anything without an
actual example. The manipulation of numbers instead of
symbols helped to assimilate the physical signification of the
definitions introduced in the course. This application done, we
continued the case study by presenting in detail the material
chosen for the core and finally address non-technical
constraints.
This core has been realized with loess, which are aeolian
materials transported in periglacial conditions and deposited in
cold steppe, mainly around the 50° N parallel to the northern
hemisphere, even if there is also some deposits in South
America (Muñoz-Castelblanco, 2011). The typical process of
formation of loess is as follow:
1. Fine particles produced by glacial abrasion are
washed, transported by proglacial flows and
deposited near existing moraine.
2. Particles of sand, silt and clay are subject to cycles of
freezing and thawing. They are eroded and
transported by the continuous action of cold and dry
winds. These winds are created by existing high
pressure over the polar ice caps.
3. Sand particles, larger and heavier, are deposited first
in the form of dunes and superficial layers.
4. Particles of silt and clay are transported to areas of
low pressure in high atmosphere. Finally, these fine
particles are deposited due to several factors: climate
change, decrease of the wind speed, presence of
obstacles, captured by the vegetation or snow cover
(Antoine, 2002).
Loess are mainly composed of silt-sized particles of about 5 to
80 microns and an important fraction of clay. They generally
have the following characteristics (Smalley, 1971; Jamagne
and al., 1981; Lautridou, 1985; Pécsi, 1990):
 homogeneous structure and porous,
 absence of stratification,
 abundance of particles of about 30 mm silt, clay (1518%), and sand (<2%),
 presence of carbonates,
 predominance of minerals such as quartz grains (⋍
70%), iron (1.5 - 2%) and organic carbon (0.2%).

low plasticity and are fragile and dilatant, meaning that they
are easily erodible (formation of channels) and that they can
loss their waterproofing function.
This presentation done, the forensic question to the students
was: with respect to their poor mechanical characteristics,
why did the engineers choose the loess for the realization of
the core? Here started a discussion about the incompetence of
engineers, the irresponsibility of people involved in this
project or the lack of knowledge at that time. Finally, a student
guessed that this soil was the cheapest for the core. After
investigation, they realized that the transportation of the soil
represents a major element of the cost of an earth dam and that
the volume of 3 965 466 m3 represent approximately
2 203 036 T of soil and, if we consider a load of 15T per truck,
146 869 trucks, that should be multiplied by the number of
kilometers done by each truck… a good reason to explain the
choice of local material for the realization of the core and to
continue the discussion on the topic of ethics. Students finally
realized that non-technical aspects can represent some severe
constraints on a project, but that no concession should be done
with the security of people.

Compaction
The second example deals with the compaction of the different
zones. During the post-failure investigations, the embankment
fill overlying the left abutment key trench was excavated for
inspection. The Fig. 7 presents the dam nowadays, where we
can see the zone of failure on the left of the picture and the
zone of investigation on the right. This excavation was
performed during the summer 1977 and did not revealed any
findings of major significance, except a thin zone of soil with
a very high water content encountered at a depth of
approximately 66 m from the top of the dam. The discovery of
this extensive wet seam on the left side of the embankment
immediately led to the speculation that a similar seam could
have generated the failure on the right of the embankment.
Following the presentation of these investigations, the opinion
of the students on the wet seam theory has been asked. Here
started a succession of suppositions guided by new results of
investigation given step by step to the students.

In the case of the Teton dam, the loess have been derived from
the Rocky Mountains and carried into the Idaho by the Snake
River. The volume of 3 965 466 m3 necessary for the
realization of the core has been taken in the area of the dam.
As regards their mechanical behavior, the loess have a very
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Fig. 7 : Teton Dam nowadays
Photography credit: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
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Firstly, the IRG report (1980) revealed that the location of the
wet seam was essentially parallel and just above the winter
shut-down surface (1974-1975). As a consequence, the
forensic reflection of the students pointed out that this area
was realized during the spring of 1975 and that the effect of
frost action on the soil to explain the presence of the wet seam
has to be discarded: a conclusion similar to the IRG report and
a good opportunity to make a digression about the damages
that could be performed by the frost action.
The second element given to the students concerned the
precipitations encountered during this period of construction.
Indeed, there were two extended period of shut-down due to
wet weather from April 29th to May 29th, 1975, and snow or
rain occurred during the construction on May 5th, 6th, 19th, and
21st, 1975. This new information was immediately followed
by interjection from several students referring to the course
that they were just listening to. These students leaded the
discussion and explained that this wet weather could have
impact the compaction ration and the quality of the core: a
direct application of the course….
Moreover, some indications regarding the control during the
construction were given to the students. In particular, the daily
reports revealed that the earthwork inspection staff did not
reach its full capacity until May 12th, 1975, and that the
frequency of the control tests was lower than required in May,
1975. Once again, this element permitted a discussion about
the responsibility of the engineers and the need of controls,
which could have revealed the bad compaction of the wet
seam zone. The hypothesis about the reason why the
inspection staff did not reached its full capacity also lead to a
discussion about human constraints in a project.
Finally, the course was closed with expert’s conclusion about
the eventual presence of a wet seam in the zone of failure.
These experts concluded that it seems unlikely that a similar
wet seam could have existed on the other side of the dam for
the following reasons:
 the elevation of the winter shut-down surface (19741975) was higher in the zone of failure than in the
zone investigated,
 the wet seam observed in the investigated zone was
placed during the period from May 1st to May 29th,
1975, while the filling in the failure zone restarted
only at May 29th. No anomaly was observed in the
investigated zone placed after that date, and we can
guess the same for the failure zone.
 No evidence of any wet seam on the exposed face of
the embankment after the failure had been
encountered.

Paper No. 1.09b

CONCLUSION
The introduction of case studies in the curriculum of civil
engineer students permits to illustrate non-technical aspects of
a project. Study of failures such as Teton Dam is particularly
interesting from an educational point of view because it
unfortunately illustrates the implication of engineering
activities. As a consequence, a failure reinforces the potential
impact of economical, human or environmental constraints on
a project and attends to inculcate responsibilities and ethics to
these future engineers.
Starting from a technical aspect presenting a default of
conception, the students have to understand the reasons
leading to an inappropriate choice of materials, design,
methodology or control of the works. This approach stimulates
self-reflection of students and reinforces their conception of
responsibilities in their future profession.
This methodology is presently testing in the course of soil
mechanics at Polytechnique Montreal and future works related
to this new approach will consist in an evaluation of the course
at the end of the present fall 2012 session.
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